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I. INTRODUCTION
The year was 1988. A nine-year old boy was on his way to school
when he was abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).2 That
boy, once described to be shy and innocent,3 would go on to spend
the rest of his adolescent life as a soldier; forced to commit
unfathomable atrocities both in numbers and in agony; not only in
scale, but in severity.
Thirty years later, that boy would come to be known as Dominic
Ongwen—the Brigadier General of the LRA and member of the core
leadership responsible for devising and implementing attacks upon
civilian populations.4 Currently, he is charged before the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with seventy counts of crimes
2. Andrew Green, To Forgive a Warlord, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 6, 2015, 9:00
AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/ongwen-uganda-icc-joseph-kony-inter
national-justice/.
3. Id.
4. See OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE TRIAL OF DOMINIC ONGWEN
AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2-4 (2016), https://www.opensociety
foundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-ongwen-20161129%20(2)1.pdf.
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against humanity and war crimes—the highest number of charges an
accused has faced before the Court.5
A former child soldier himself, Ongwen is charged with the same
crimes of which he was victim. International law expressly prohibits
the recruitment and use of children in hostilities.6 Other than the risk
to their physical well-being, children’s participation in armed
conflicts causes particularly severe trauma, contributing to their
penchant for violence.7 A child soldier’s active participation in armed
hostilities “teaches [them] the rule and culture of violence, disrupts
their education and frequently results in gravest traumas, since
children are even less capable to deal with the horrors of war than
grown adults.”8 The ICC itself in the case against Congolese warlord
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo recognized the omnipresent “environment of
terror” that child soldiers are subjected to when abducted.9
The protected status of the child is enshrined throughout
international law, including the Rome Statute which excludes from
the Court’s jurisdiction “any person who was under the age of
eighteen at the time of the commission of a crime.”10 But note the
ultimate irony. While legal doctrine recognizes the child soldier as
the victim of war, Ongwen, a former child soldier, is tried as the
perpetrator. Prosecutor v. Ongwen hence raises novel questions as to
the child soldier; as to their status’ longevity and potential criminal
responsibility. As argued by Ongwen’s defense counsel, if “the laws
of war were meant to protect children[,] it is inapposite to suggest
5. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET THE
PROSECUTOR V. DOMINIC ONGWEN (Jan. 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
pids/publications/ongweneng.pdf.
6. See H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., The Criminal Nature of Recruitment of Child
Soldiers Under International Humanitarian Law, 1 ASIA PAC. Y.B. INT’L HUMAN.
L. 113, 113 (2005).
7. See Stuart Beresford, Child Witnesses and the International Criminal
Justice System: Does the International Criminal Court Protect the Most
Vulnerable?, 3 J. INT’LCRIM. JUST. 721, 724 (2005).
8. See CYNTHIA CHAMBERLAIN BOLAÑOS, CHILDREN AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ANALYSIS OF THE ROME STATUTE THROUGH A
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 109 (Leiden Univ. ed., 2014).
9. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Opening Statement, 6
(Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2009_00591.PDF.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 106, 2187 UNTS 90
(adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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that individual criminal liability can then be imposed upon those like
[Ongwen] who should have been protected but ended up
enslaved[.]”11
The purpose of this Paper is to look at the doctrinal challenges
embodied in Prosecutor v. Ongwen: A tug-of-war between liability,
as imposed under international humanitarian law (IHL) and
international criminal law (ICL), and protection, as embodied
throughout international human rights law (IHRL), IHL, and ICL.
This Paper seeks to confront the difficult question of holding the
child soldier, who climbed the ranks, accountable. Part I will be
devoted to establishing the premise of the study. The Paper will look
at the factual milieu in which Ongwen is based. Part II will delve into
possible grounds for excluding criminal responsibility for the child
soldier turned alleged war criminal. Distinct from Ongwen’s Defense
Counsel’s approach,12 Part II will advance Ongwen’s “rotten social
background”13 not as a form of duress,14 but as a mental defect.15 Part
III will conclude with a caveat addressing the doctrinal repercussions
posed in ruling for or against the former child soldier who has come
of age.
II. DOMINIC ONGWEN’S ROTTEN
SOCIAL BACKGROUND
A. CHILD SOLDIERING IN CONTEXT
Actus me incito factus non est meus actus is a basic tenet of
criminal justice meaning: ‘an act done by me against my will is not
my act.’16 For this reason, involuntary actions caused by either
11. Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen
(No. ICC-02/04-01/15), Pre-Trial Chamber, 25 May 2016.
12. See id.
13. Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQ. 9, 11
(1985).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107-08.
15. Id.
16. See id. (allowing for a defense before the ICC based on the circumstances
being out on one’s control); see also Enriquez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
120744-46, 689 Phil. Rep. 75 (S.C., June 25, 2012), http://sc.judiciary.
gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/120744-46.htm#_ftn130.
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external restraints on volition or internal interference with cognition17
are expressly excluded by the Rome Statute from criminal
responsibility.18
The Rotten Social Background doctrine, in recognizing the
relationship between environmental adversity and criminal
propensity,19 advances the theory that a person’s criminal behavior
may at times be caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her
control.20 Hence, when environmental tensions create a
predisposition to commit crime, it would be an injustice to adjudge
culpability.21
This Part seeks to establish the factual milieu from which Ongwen
stems. By delving into the details of Ongwen’s life as a child soldier
turned warlord of the LRA, the author will illustrate not only the
factual background of the case but a rotten social background as a
possible defense.
B. THE CRIMINALNATURE OF THE RECRUITMENT AND
USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS
A child soldier refers to any person below eighteen years of age
who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or
armed group in any capacity.22 Regardless of how they are recruited,
the armed child is recognized as a victim23 whose participation in
conflict bears serious implications on their physical and emotional
well-being.24 There is a growing body of evidence which reveals a
correlation between exposure to war and physical, psychological, and
psychosocial effects: the more disturbances to the physiology of a
17. See Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The
Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination
and “Rotten Social Background”, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 53, 55 (2011).
18. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107-08.
19. See Delgado, supra note 13, at 9.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 324 (2010).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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victim the larger the scar of psychological disorder.25
For this reason, inter alia, IHL prohibits the recruitment of
children as combatants.26 Article 77 of the First Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Convention expressly confers upon the child a “special
respect [which] shall be protected against any form of indecent
assault.”27 It obliges “parties to the conflict [to] take all feasible
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and . . . refrain
from recruiting them into their armed forces,” and, in recruiting
among those persons who are between fifteen and eighteen years old,
parties to the conflict are obliged to “give priority to those who are
oldest.”28
These protections are echoed throughout IHL and IHRL
instruments alike. The Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Convention enshrined the protected status of the child as
Fundamental Guarantees in Article 4(3).29 Similarly, Article 38 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child obliges state parties to respect
and ensure respect for the rules of IHL relevant to the child, to take
all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the
age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities, and to
“refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of
fifteen years into their armed forces.”30
Subsequently, the minimum age of recruitment was increased to
eighteen years through the Optional Protocol to the Rights of the
Child,31 reflecting International Labor Organization Convention 182,
which recognized the recruitment and use of child soldiers as one of
25. See id.
26. Roque, supra note 6, at 113.
27. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, LEGAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN
ARMED CONFLICT (2003), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ang0303
juridiquenewlogo.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, opened for
signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
31. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict pmbl., May 25, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1286,
2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
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the “worst forms of child labour.”32 However, this more lenient
threshold has yet to achieve the status of customary international law
and was purposely excluded from the Rome Statute.33
Professor H. Harry L. Roque, a leading Constitutionalist and
Public International Law expert of the University of the Philippines,
points out that while the recruitment is
indeed prohibited under IHL, it does not appear to criminalize the act:
Proof of this includes the fact that recruitment of children is not among
those acts classified by the Geneva Conventions as grave breaches which
State Parties to the Conventions are treaty bound to criminalize through
domestic penal legislation. Neither is child recruitment among those
crimes tried by the Ad Hoc World War II Tribunals, be it in Nuremberg or
Tokyo. This failure to prosecute particularly by the Nuremberg Tribunal
is a significant indicator that the act has not been criminalized since
children were widely recruited as combatants, particularly by Nazi
Germany, and yet not a single Nazi was tried for it. The same may be said
of the Statutes that created the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. There is nothing in their
respective statutes that granted these tribunals jurisdiction to try
individuals for the recruitment of children. Furthermore, even in the
human rights treaties that do prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers,
there is no duty imposed on State Parties to enact domestic legislation
criminalizing the act. As if to highlight the non-criminal nature of child
recruitment, the UN Secretary-General included in his 2005 report a
recommendation that: “National governments should enact and apply
relevant legislation to ensure the protection, rights, and well-being of
children and should ensure the protection and rehabilitation of war
affected children within their jurisdiction.” This recommendation seems
to concede the need to enact domestic penal legislation to criminalize
recruitment of children.34
It was not until the Rome Statute that an international treaty
32. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour art. 3, opened for signature June
17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Nov. 19, 2000).
33. See GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 332
(T.M.C. Asser Press 2005) (mentioning a comparable treaty that had achieved
customary International law status because 191 Member States had ratified the
convention).
34. Roque, supra note 6, at 118-19.
612 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [33:3
criminalized the prohibited act of child recruitment.35 During the
negotiations of the Preparatory Committee and the Rome
Conference, the majority recognized that child soldiering was a
“virtually universally accepted prohibition . . . of most serious
concern.”36 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute expressly
criminalized “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to
participate actively in hostilities.”37
It has been argued that the sheer depravity of using children as the
pawns of war calls for the criminalization of child soldiering under
customary international law.38 Advocates of this opinion cite the
Rome Statute to bolster that argument.39 While this is undoubtedly a
claim founded on noble convictions, the status of child soldiering as
a customary norm cannot be hinged on the Rome Statute alone40
absent a showing of state practice and opinio juris.41
As of December 3, 2016, only 124 out of a total of 197 states have
ratified the ICC Statute,42 albeit already comprising a “majority of all
35. Cf. id. (stating that International humanitarian law prohibits child soldier
recruitment but does not consider it a crime).
36. Michael Cottier, Article 8 War Crimes – para. 2(b)(xxvi), in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT – OBSERVERS’
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 466, 468 (Otto Triffterer ed., C.H. Beck, Hart &
Nomos 2nd ed. 2008).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 97.
38. WERLE, supra note 33, at 331 (outlining the novel law in which child
soldier recruitment is criminalized under the ICC statute).
39. Id. (citing the dissenting opinion in Prosecutor v. Norman that “non-
forcible child recruitment” was not a crime under International law until the 1997
Rome Statute).
40. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000) (outlining the incoherence of the Rome Statute on individual
criminal liability for war crimes); see also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-
2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction,
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, ¶ 47 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May
31, 2004), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/131/SCSL-04-
14-AR72(E)-131.pdf (arguing that the court did not have authority to penalize
individual criminal liability for war crimes).
41. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den. & Ger./Neth.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (explaining the process involved for a state
practice to become opinio juris).
42. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS
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States, [this] could hardly qualify as ‘virtually uniform’” accession.43
Interestingly, the lack of state practice is evidenced by the fact that
the “[s]tates that have not ratified the Rome Statute comprise an
overwhelming majority of the world’s population and account for
more than two-thirds of the planet’s population.”44 As to opinio juris,
“only a number of countries have enacted domestic legislation
criminalizing child recruitment.”45
Other than the severe consequences suffered by children in
hostilities,46 the basis for arguing that child soldiering is criminalized
as a customary norm is wanting. Hence the recruitment and use of
children remains a treaty-based crime; but this is not to say that it is
criminalized through the Rome Statute alone.
Through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions
1261 (1999),47 1314 (2000),48 1379 (2001),49 1460 (2003),50 and 1539
(2004),51 child soldiering was expressly recognized as a war crime.52
While the law-making function of the UNSC was not intended to be
a source of international law per se,53 it is “today recognized as a
distinct source of obligation,”54 which member nations of the UN are
bound to “accept and carry out.”55 Hence, while the criminal nature
of the recruitment and use of children has yet to crystalize as
customary international law, there is sufficient legal basis to forward
its criminalization beyond the four corners of the Rome Statute.56
TREATY MATTERS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsgno=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=en (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) (showing
that the Rome Statute had not garnered sufficient state practice or adoption since it
was enacted).
43. Roque, supra note 6, at 121.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. WERLE, supra note 33, at 331.
47. S.C. Res. 1261, ¶ 2 (Aug. 25, 1999).
48. S.C. Res. 1314, ¶ 1 (Aug. 11, 2000).
49. S.C. Res. 1379, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 2001).
50. S.C. Res. 1460, pmbl. (Jan. 30, 2003).
51. S.C. Res. 1539, ¶ 1 (Apr. 22, 2004).
52. Id.
53. Roque, supra note 6, at 129.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Roque, supra note 6, at 121 (concluding that the Rome Statute is yet to
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C. THE LORD’S RESISTANCEARMY
The conflict in northern Uganda began soon after President
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) took power in
1986.57 The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), a Ugandan rebel group
and predecessor to the LRA, was established under the leadership of
Alice Auma, a self-proclaimed spiritual medium.58 Allegedly
directed by divine instruction, the HSM sought to “organize a war
against evil forces that had come to plague the Acholi” and to
“restore stature in northern Ugandan politics, and lead a cleansing of
Acholi society.”59
The HSM launched several successful attacks against Yoweri’s
NRA, falling within 100 kilometers of the capital city, Kampala, in
1987.60 The HSM ultimately faded into history when its leader Alice
Auma fled to seek refuge in neighboring Kenya.61 It was from the
remnants of the HSM that Joseph Kony formed what has now come
to be known as the LRA.62
Similar to the HSM, the LRA is dedicated to the overthrow of the
Ugandan government.63 Its vision for Uganda is based on extreme
interpretations of Christian beliefs founded upon Biblical
Millennialism—the coming of a golden age.64 Under the leadership
get wide-spread adoption but its strict enforcement under the United Nation gives
it sufficient credence to be binding on member states).
57. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 3 (stating that the main objective of the
Ugandan rebel group was to usurp power from the incumbent government).
58. See OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 3 (mentioning that
the leader of the LRA formed the group from a spiritual movement: Holy Spirit
Movement).
59. ANDRE LE SAGE, COUNTERING THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IN
CENTRALAFRICA 3-4 (Inst. for Nat’l Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum 2011).
60. Id.
61. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 3.
62. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Prosecution’s Pre-Trial
Brief, ¶ 11 (Sept. 6, 2016) (outlining the relationship between the Holy Spirit
Movement and Lord’s Resistance Army rebel groups in Uganda).
63. Id.
64. E. Mallonga, The Protection of Children in International Armed Conflict
Recovering, in CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 39, 42
(Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan & H. Harry L. Roque Jr. eds., U. Phil. Law Ctr.-
Inst. of Int’l & Legal Studies 2006).
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of Kony, who is an alleged spirit medium like Auma before him, the
LRA would go on to eclipse the other armed groups operating in
northern Uganda,65 becoming one of Africa’s most brutal militia
forces.66
The ICC proceedings cofnirm that the LRA was an organized
group capable of committing widespread and systematic attacks
against civilian populations.67 It is recognized by all three sides of the
argument—the Office of the Prosecutor, Defense Counsel, and the
Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”)—that the LRA
is not a run-of-the-mill guerilla force but a well-organized rebel
group bound by hierarchical structures and internal policies.68 The
LRA had both military and tactical ability. They had an inflow of
weapons and ammunition and “followed a regular pattern in
implementing its policies of persecuting, murdering, pillaging,
torturing, enslaving, raping and otherwise committing sexual and
gender-based crimes, inflicting cruel or inhumane treatments, and
abducting children.”69
The LRA used children as a vital resource,70 continuously
abducting children to join their ranks.71 Children “were easily
malleable to whatever purpose Kony wanted and were quick to obey
[his] orders.”72 As argued by the OPCV, “children copy exactly what
they learn during training. They don’t pretend.”73 As of 2006, the
LRA had abducted an estimated 25,000 children into its ranks.74
As it stands, the LRA remains one of Africa’s most brutal militia
65. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 3.
66. SAGE, supra note 59, at 1.
67. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 62.
68. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 3, 6 (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2017_00900.PDF.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 13.
71. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 4.
72. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 13.
73. Id.
74. UNICEF, UGANDA UNICEF HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN 2007,
https://www.unicef.org/har07/files/Uganda.pdf.
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forces75 though its roster has dwindled.76 Attributed to effective
military operations and a successful defection campaign, LRA troops
have greatly declined from the thousands in the late 1990s and early
2000s to a reported 150-200 core combatants.77 Unfortunately, at
least a half of that roster is believed to be composed of abductees.78
D. DOMINICONGWEN INDOCTRINATED
In 1988, Dominic Ongwen, then only a nine-year-old boy, was
abducted by the LRA. Stolen from his family and community,
Ongwen was taken to an LRA training area where “his abductors
beat, tortured and subjected him to constant acts of violence and
forced him to perform the same on others”—acts that no person, let
alone a child, should undergo. 79
Ongwen would go on to spend the rest of his adolescent life as a
child soldier, forced to commit unfathomable atrocities in both scale
and severity. In Ongwen’s own words, he entered the LRA “blind
and deaf.”80 Like any child of tender age, he was greatly
impressionable, acquiring ideas and ideologies from his
environment, particularly from his elders.81 It is well to take note that
international law recognizes a child’s tractability and serves as a
rationale behind the prohibition on child soldiering.82
75. SAGE, supra note 59, at 1.
76. Id. at 7.
77. See Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander of U.S. Africa
Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 19 (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez_03-26-15.pdf;
see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the
Situation in Central Africa and the Activities of the United Nations Regional Office
for Central Africa, ¶¶ 16-19, U.N. Doc. S/2015/339 (May 14, 2015),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_339.pdf.
78. SAGE, supra note 59, at 7.
79. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 56.
80. Moses Akena, Ongwen Speaks Out on Why He Quit LRA, DAILYMONITOR
(Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Ongwen-speaks-out-on-
why-he-quit-LRA/688334-2593818-pdgo8vz/index.html.
81. See ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO ET AL., TORTURE OF CHILDREN IN
SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE 78 (2000)
(describing how children develop politically).
82. WERLE, supra note 33, at 332.
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Indoctrination of newly abducted children into the LRA is
executed via a complex system of control.83 The six-month process is
described as brutal at minimum84 and includes control mechanisms
such as physical, linguistic, or cultural isolation; public violence;
forced complicity; and an “assignment” to a family structure.85
The methods employed by the LRA range from the unacceptable
to the outlandish. Children were “required to participate not only in
the murderous attacks on civilian camps but in the individual acts of
torture and murder designed to convince recently abducted children
that they were so steeped in blood that there could be no acceptance
for them back in civilian society.”86 If not on the receiving end of the
blow, it was common for the LRA to force children to witness or
commit violent acts against their fellow abductee.87 On the other
hand, “young recruits were made to taste the blood of the dead child
after such a killing or eat with bloodied hands while sitting atop a
dead body.”88
The brutality of the LRA’s indoctrination process is encapsulated
by the testimony of Moses, a former child soldier who was abducted
at the age of ten:
It takes time, about six months, to brainwash the new abductees totally.
What they do first is, when you are still new, beat you about 500 times.
But if you are lucky it is only 200. Then they force you to watch terrible
83. Jocelyn TD Kelly, Lindsay Branham & Michele R. Decker, Abducted
Children and Youth in Lord’s Resistance Army in Northeastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC): Mechanisms of Indoctrination and Control,
CONFLICT & HEALTH, May 18, 2016, at 4, https://conflictandhealth.bio
medcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-016-0078-5 (noting that the LRA
preferred children over adults because children were more vulnerable and easier to
control).
84. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, COERCION AND INTIMIDATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS
TO PARTICIPATE IN VIOLENCE 11-12 (2008), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/relatedmaterial/2008.04ChildSoldiers.pdf.
85. Kelly, Branham & Decker, supra note 83, at 4.
86. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 56.
87. NADIA GRANT, DURESS AS A DEFENCE FOR FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS?
DOMINIC ONGWEN AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 7 (Int’l Crimes
Database, Brief 21, 2016), http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/upload/
documents/20161209T155029-ICD%20Brief%20Nadia%20Grant%202.pdf.
88. Id. at 8.
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things. We were abducted as a group of students. One of us was brought
in front of us and killed there so that we could see. Those are the things
they do. They force us to do it. Then, second, anyone among you who
tries to escape will be killed the same way. So, as this might be the first
time you see a person being killed, this will traumatise you and make you
very afraid.89
But this is not to say that the internal atrocities of the LRA are
isolated to the child soldier alone. The relationship of both the
abductee and ranked officer with the LRA is comparable to that of a
dog and its master; “When you tell a dog to do something, it will act
as instructed.”90 In the LRA, that master was Kony.91 Everything—
the attacks, the ambushes, the abductions—was an execution of his
will. Dissatisfaction would be answerable by death.92
It is in this context that Ongwen climbed the ranks to become the
Brigadier General of the LRA.93 On July 8, 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber
II of the ICC issued warrants of arrest against him.94 It was only
about ten years later that Ongwen surrendered to U.S. military
personnel stationed in the Central African Republic. He was
eventually transferred to the ICC detention center in The Hague on
January 21, 2015.95 In his capacity as Brigade Commander of the
Sinia Brigade of the LRA, he was charged before the ICC with
seventy counts of crimes against humanity96 and war crimes.97
Prosecutor v. Ongwen is a case of many firsts for the ICC. Not
only is Ongwen the first member of the LRA to appear before the
ICC, but he is also the first former child soldier to be prosecuted
before an international tribunal. Notably, he is likewise the first
person charged by an international tribunal for committing crimes of
89. Ariadne Asimakopoulos, Justice and Accountability: Complex Political
Perpetrators Abducted as Children by the LRA in Northern Uganda 31 (Aug. 13,
2010) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Utrecht University) (on file with Utrecht
University Repository), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/179214.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 2.
94. Id. at 3.
95. INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT, supra note 5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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which he himself was victim.98
III. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HUNTED
WHO BECAME THE HUNTER
Children are but the pawns of war.99 On one hand, thousands of
young boys and girls are used as puppets in the conflicts of men;
they are abducted and beaten into submission, and exploited as
couriers, sex slaves, and menials.100 On the other hand, children are
also sought out as victims to heighten the propaganda value of
existing power brokers, becoming unfortunate but expendable
casualties of war.101
Whether the child pulls the trigger or is but caught in the crossfire,
international law recognizes children in armed conflict for what they
truly are: victims.102 The dangers posed to children are not isolated to
physical well-being alone, but psychosocial difficulties that greatly
affect their development.103 This is because the “experiences of
children derive from their environment are the primary factors that
determine their physical, emotional, social, and cognitive progress or
delay.”104 Considering the severe consequences suffered by children
in hostilities alone, it has been submitted that customary international
law comprehensively criminalized the recruitment and use of child
soldiers.105
Ongwen hence raises novel questions as to the victim status of the
child soldier. While international law recognizes the child soldier’s
protected status, Ongwen, a former child soldier himself, is tried as
the perpetrator. But surely the hunted does not ipso facto become the
98. GRANT, supra note 87, at 1.
99. A. Pierre Casiraghi, Remarks in Areas of Armed Conflict (Aug. 24, 2006),
in CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 63 (Elizabeth
Aguiling-Pangalangan & H. Harry L. Roque Jr. eds., U. Phil. Law Ctr.-Inst. of Int’l
& Legal Studies 2006).
100. Child Recruitment and Use, OFF. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SECRETARY-
GEN. CHILDREN & ARMED CONFLICT, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/
effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
101. Casiraghi, supra note 100, at 62.
102. Id.
103. PROTACIO-MARCELINO ET AL., supra note 81, at 59.
104. Id.
105. WERLE, supra note 33, at 331. Contra Casiraghi, supra note 101.
620 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [33:3
hunter upon his eighteenth birthday. Indeed, if the laws were meant
to protect the child, it is inapposite to suggest that individual criminal
liability can then be imposed by the sheer passage of time.106 Having
established the factual milieu from which Ongwen stems, the
following segment will entertain Ongwen’s rotten social background
as a ground of exculpation.
A. ARTICLE 31: GROUNDS FOR EXCLUDING
CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY
Exculpating circumstances played a marginal role in the early
history of international law.107 Notably, no grounds for excluding
criminal responsibility were provided under the Nuremburg Charter,
nor the in the statutes of the Yugoslavia or the Rwanda Tribunals. In
this respect inter alia, the Rome Statute makes “great strides in the
direction of a fully-developed system of criminal law.”108 Article 31
reads in part:
In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if,
at the time of that person’s conduct:
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys
that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his
or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform
to the requirements of law;
. . .
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a
threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily
harm against that person or another person, and the person acts
necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the
person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to
be avoided. Such a threat may either be:
106. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 56.
107. WERLE, supra note 33, at 138.
108. Id. at 139.
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(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s
control.109
The following segment seeks to address the liability of the child
soldier under the defenses of duress and mental defect. Because the
Court directly addresses issues of duress in the Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Against Dominic Ongwen,110 emphasis will
be placed on the Rotten Social Background defense as a mental
defect under Article 31(1)(a).
1. Duress: The Devil’s Choice
As emphasized by Ongwen’s Defense Counsel, “it is not open to
debate that [Ongwen] suffered all [the] vagaries of life” as a child
soldier of the LRA.111 All three sides of the argument—the Defense,
Prosecutor, and OPCV—agree that Ongwen was abducted and
brutally indoctrinated by the LRA.112 Certainly not even the most
eloquent argument can separate Ongwen the victim from Ongwen
the commander. Indeed, the child who suffers from the soldiering
cannot be separated from the soldier he grew up to become. The
defense counsel argues that this is true considering the LRA
victimized Ongwen during his formative years:113
Look at a small boy, a child who has been brought in the bushes and has
not had the opportunity to relate with common society, common decent
society, a boy who has no hope at all of ever returning to normal society,
a boy who has no governmental protection to which to return or to report
for protection, a boy whose only protection and guarantee to life was
compliance, compliance or death. That is what I earlier on said, he was
left with “the devil’s choice.” Your Honours, what do we mean by the
devil’s choice? [I]n a decision in the Ugandan court . . . dictator Idi Amin
directed a certain woman to sell her property to the embassy of Somalia.
109. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107 (emphasis added).
110. WERLE, supra note 33, at 139 (recognizing the Court has allowed defenses
of duress); Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision
on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 151.
111. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 60-61.
112. Id. at 61.
113. PROTACIO-MARCELINO ET AL., supra note 81, at 78.
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The woman was left with no choice but to sell the property. When Idi
Amin was overthrown, this lady went to court, but the defendant brought
the sale agreement and said, “But you signed this document selling your
property.” And the decision was as to whether she voluntarily consented
to sell her property. Their Lordships in that case, your Honours, said no,
that was not consent. Given the dictatorship of Idi Amin and his
propensity to kill anybody who stood in his way, the lady was left with no
choice but the devil’s choice. . . . Your Honours, we submit that in
everything that Dominic Ongwen did, he was left with the devil’s
choice.114
Ongwen’s defense counsel argues that “throughout the turns
and twists in the armed conflicts between the government of Uganda
and the LRA, [Ongwen] lived his life under duress.”115 The “all-
knowing and all-seeing Joseph Kony instilled institutional ethos that
required complete compliance and discipline.”116 An alleged spirit
medium, Kony utilized religious indoctrination to rule with complete
and unfettered power.117 Throughout “the rest of [Ongwen’s] life and
until surrendering to the U.S. Special Forces, [Ongwen] remained
under the apprehension of fear of imminent death, especially if he
were to flee.”118 Hence, Ongwen had only the devil’s choice.
As opined by the Court in the Decision on Confirmation of
Charges, duress would exclude criminal responsibility when:
(i) the conduct of the person has been caused by duress resulting from a
threat (whether made by other persons or constituted by circumstances
beyond the person’s control) of imminent death or of continuing or
imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person; and
(ii) the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat,
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the
one sought to be avoided.119
114. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 49.
115. Id. at 57.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 56.
118. Id. at 57.
119. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 152.
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The Pre–Trial Chamber ruled that the defense failed to establish
that Ongwen’s acts were either necessary, in terms of an absence of
alternatives, or reasonable, to the end that the harm sought to be
avoided outweighed the harm caused.120 As to the first element, there
was no showing that the perceived “threat of death” was imminent.121
The court ruled that such an interpretation would dangerously
“provide a blanket immunity to members of criminal organisations
which have brutal systems of ensuring discipline.”122
As to the second element of duress, otherwise referred to as the
choice-of-lesser-evil approach, an act is proportionate if “the crime
committed under duress [is], on balance, the lesser of two evils.”123 It
remains unclear how Ongwen’s conduct would be necessary and
reasonable to avoid the alleged threat and satisfy “the required intent
of proportionality for those crimes committed against the civilian
population.”124 Considering the number of charges alone, which
include various attacks on internally displaced persons camps in
Pajule, Odek, Lukodi, and Abokl,125 as well as sexual and gender
based crimes,126 Ongwen faces an uphill battle in arguing duress to
escape criminal responsibility.127 This is further bolstered by the fact
120. Albin Eser, Article 31 Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT –
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 863, 871 (Otto Triffterer ed., C.H.
Beck, Hart & Nomos 2nd ed. 2008).
121. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 153.
122. Id. (holding that the Statute would not allow duress to be used if members
of criminal organizations claim involuntary involvement).
123. Shane Darcy, Defenses to International Crimes, in ROUTLEDGEHANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 231, 235 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz
eds. 2010% (citin! Prosecutor v. *rdemović, Case No. )T-96-22-A, Appeals (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 2007)) (noting separate and
dissenting opinions by Judge Cassese).
124. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 155.
125. Id. ¶¶ 65-85 (findings of crimes committed).
126. Id. ¶¶ 86-140; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 5 (“War
crimes: attack against the civilian population; murder and attempted murder; rape;
sexual slavery; torture; cruel treatment; outrages upon personal dignity; destruction
of property; pillaging; the conscription and use of children under the age of 15 to
participate actively in hostilities.”).
127. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 5 (“Dominic Ongwen is
accused, pursuant to articles 25(3) (a) (direct perpetration, indirect perpetration and
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that Ongwen is charged not only as a direct and indirect perpetrator
but under command responsibility as well.128 In determining the
limits on duress and necessity, “the perpetrator’s position in the
military hierarchy must be taken into account.” 129
2. Insanity: The Rotten Social Background
In the Open Session of the Confirmation of Charges, the defense
argued that Ongwen “was so obfuscated and befuddled by the hard
experience [as a child soldier with the LRA] and the . . . devil’s
choice he was left with.”130 As to why the Defense Counsel sought to
incorporate Ongwen’s rotten social background as duress rather than
as a form of mental incapacity remains to be seen. This segment will
entertain this latter thought.
Article 31(1)(a) of the Rome Statute excludes from criminal
responsibility persons who suffer “from a mental disease or defect
that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or
nature of his or her conduct[.]”131 This provision embodies the “well-
established principle of national criminal justice systems that
incapacity or legal insanity serves as a categorical exclusion of
criminal responsibility.”132 For a successful defense of insanity, the
defense must establish:
1. That, at the time of the person’s conduct, the person suffers from a
indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (ordering), 25(3)(d)(i) and (ii) and 28(a)
(command responsibility) of the Rome Statute, for the following crimes against
humanity and war crimes. . . .”); WERLE, supra note 33, at 148 (citing Prosecutor
v. %r!emović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Separate
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997)); K. AMBOS, DER ALLGEMEINE TIL DES VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS 856
(2002); G-J. KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 68 (2001).
128. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 72.
129. WERLE, supra note 33, at 331.
130. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 56.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107.
132. Eser, supra note 121, at 873 n.50 (citing GERHARD WERLE,
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT ¶ 375 n.245 (2003)); Prosecutor v. Mucić, Case No. )T-16-
21-A, Judgment, ¶ 582 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20,
2001).
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mental disease or defect; and
2. That the disease or defect destroys the person’s “capacity to
appreciate” the unlawfulness of his conduct or the “capacity to control”
his conduct.133
The first element concerns the kind of impairment, i.e. a “mental
disease or defect.”134 Due to the ambiguity of these terms, what
conditions among an array of infirmities falling within the ambit of
“mental disease or defect” are not settled.135 However, the mental
defects contemplated in Article 31 generally refer to both
impairments of cognition, i.e. awareness and understanding,136 and
volition, i.e. uncontrollable, irresistible impulses.137 Indeed, as
forwarded by Professor Albin Eser, it is both unnecessary and
impracticable to interpret Article 21 as referring only to either
cognition or volition because psychiatric distinction is in constant
flux.138
Notably, the term “insanity”, let alone “clinical insanity”, is not
mentioned within the four corners of the Rome Statute. Rather, an
obscure and malleable standard of “mental disease or defect” was
adopted, which encompasses “any mental defect that achieves a
degree of severity and permanence and can disrupt the perpetrator’s
ability to appreciate or control his or her conduct.”139 This excludes
merely temporary states of exhaustion or excitement,140 as well as
emotional disturbances such as deep sorrow or blind rage.141 Only
133. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. WILLIAM WILSON, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE AND THEORY 231 (I.H.
Dennis et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2003).
137. Delgado, supra note 13, at 11 (citing ROLLIN PERKINS & RONALD BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 936-1015 (3d ed. 1982)); Eser, supra note 121, at 871 (citing Peter
Krug, The Emerging Mental Incapacity Defense in International Criminal Law:
Some Initial Questions of Implementation, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 324 (2000)).
138. WERLE, supra note 33, at 159 (citing Eser, supra note 121); GEERT-JAN
ALEXANDER KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 114 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers ed., 2nd ed. 2001).
139. See Prosecutor v. Mucić, Case No. IT-16-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 582 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
140. WERLE, supra note 33, at 159.
141. Id.
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“mental disturbances that destroy the perpetrator’s capacity to
appreciate” the unlawfulness of one’s own conduct can lead to the
exclusion of responsibility.142
Under the second element, one’s ability must not only be
impaired, but also destroyed.143 To avoid an unrealistic interpretation
of the law, scholars opine that only substantial, rather than absolute,
impairment of cognitive or volitional abilities suffice.144
It is submitted that an actor’s rotten social background may
constitute a mental disturbance that destroys his capacity to
appreciate the unlawfulness of his own conduct.145 Rotten Social
Background evidence consists of contextual elements such as the
subject’s childhood, squalor, or abuse.146
The Rotten Social Background defense was first raised by Judge
Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in his dissent in United States v. Alexander.147 The
defendant, Murdock, shot and killed a Marine who called him a
“black bastard.”148 Although the defense failed to establish clinical
insanity, expert testimony showed that Murdock’s “rotten social
background conditioned him to respond to certain stimuli in a
manner most of us would consider flagrantly
inappropriate.”149 Notwithstanding, the trial judge instructed the jury
to disregard testimony, resulting in a finding of guilt which resulted
in a twenty years to life sentence.150 In his dissent, Judge Bazelon
argued that the evidence of Murdock’s Rotten Social Background
should have been considered while adjudging criminal
142. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107.
143. Sander Janssen, Mental Condition Def. in Supranational Criminal Law, 4
INT’LCRIM. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004).
144. WERLE, supra note 33, at 159.
145. Mythri A. Jayaraman, Rotten Social Background Revisited, 14 CAP. DEF. J.
327, 328-29 (2002) (referring to Judge Bazelon’s dissent stating that the defendant
was not able to use the Rotten Social Background evidence to show he lacked
moral responsibility for the murder).
146. Id. at 327.
147. Id. at 327-28. See generally United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
148. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 929.
149. Id. at 960.
150. Id. at 927.
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responsibility.151
The Rotten Social Background defense is analogous to that of
coercive indoctrination—the changing of a person’s values or beliefs
through forceful means.152 As opined by Professor Paul H. Robinson
of the University of Pennsylvania:
[W]here a child’s development is under conditions that inevitably
normalize the child to see violence and deceit as acceptable and indeed
necessary methods of negotiating the challenges of daily life . . . [o]ne
could argue that such conditions are analogous to a process of coercive
indoctrination and can render an offender blameless[.] Thus, a defendant
who would not have committed the offense in question were he the “old
self” might claim that he should get a defense since he acted only because
of new beliefs and values forcibly imposed on him, for which he ought
not be held accountable.153
Involuntariness contemplates not only external restraint on
volition but also internal interference with cognition and control.154
According to Professor Richard Delgado, the relationship between
environmental adversities and criminal behavior may be so vigorous
that external factors create a propensity to commit crime.155 Indeed,
there is no culpability when a defendant’s criminal behavior is
caused by factors beyond his control.156 If only to give life to the
basic tenet of criminal justice actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, an act done against one’s will, whether by external or internal
restraint, should not be imputed as one’s own act.157
The long-term effects of child soldiering are recognized not only
as a matter of fact but as policy enshrined in various sources of
law.158 The ICC itself recognized in Lubanga the “environment of
151. Id. at 960.
152. Robinson, supra note 17, at 53.
153. Id. at 54-55.
154. Delgado, supra note 13, at 16.
155. Id. at 55-56.
156. Id. at 16.
157. See United States v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272 (S.C., Mar. 19, 1910)
(Phil.), http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/mar1910/gr_l-5272_1910.html;
Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 107.
158. See generally G.A. Res. 54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001).
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terror” that child soldiers were incessantly subjected to.159 It is
universally understood that children are a protected class who must
be guarded from exploitation.160 In international law, it is no mystery
that children’s participation in armed conflicts “teaches [them] the
rule and culture of violence, disrupts their education and frequently
results in gravest traumas, since children are even less capable to
deal with the horrors of war than grown adults.”161 Again, IHRL,
IHL, and ICL prohibit the recruitment and use of children in
hostilities for the protection of their physical, psychological, and
psychosocial well-being.162
Ongwen was undoubtedly subject to the brutalities of war. At the
young and impressionable age of nine years old, the LRA abducted
and subjected him to the vagaries of coercive indoctrination;163 a
brutal process where the child is “brainwashed”164 to abandon well-
known social paradigms and adopt a war-themed philosophy: kill or
be killed.165 In a revealing interview with the ICC prior to his
incarceration, Ongwen states, “In my mind, I thought war was the
best thing. Even up to now, I dream about war every night. But if
they don’t want to forgive me, I leave it in their hands. I have
become like a lice, which you remove from your hair or waist and
159. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Opening Statement at
6.
160. 25th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 17, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/25th-anniversary-
convention-rights-child.
161. Cottier, supra note 36, at 467.
162. Id.; PROTACIO-MARCELINO ET AL., supra note 81, at 59.
163. Robinson, supra note 17, at 70-72 (stating that Tree Frog, Alex’s captor,
put Alex through psychological debilitation by reducing his food, which in turn
gave Tree Frog extensive control over Alex).
164. Asimakopoulos, supra note 89, at 31 (stating that the LRA forced its
abductees to watch one of their own be killed to show that if they try to escape they
too will be killed).
165. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG,
Transcript of the Confirmation of Charges, 57 (testifying that in the bush it was
survival of the fittest); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Victims Who Victimize:
Transcending International Criminal Law’s Binaries, WASHINGTON& LEE PUBLIC
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 8 20-21 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter,
Drumbl, Victims Who Victimize] (describing how Ongwen rose from child soldier
to commander where he became the abuser).
2018] THE ROTTEN SOCIAL BACKGROUNDDEFENSE 629
kill without any resistance.”166
Ongwen’s values and beliefs were molded by his environment
while he was a child soldier. The LRA precisely executes a six-
month indoctrination process to inculcate abductee of its values, or
lack thereof. Because Ongwen is incapable of appreciating the
unlawfulness of his own conduct,167 it may be argued that he is
excluded from criminal responsibility under Article 31(1)(a).
Trauma is neither suffered nor alleviated in a social vacuum.
Ongwen, having spent his formative years and adult life with the
LRA, inculcates the disvalues of the same—a species of Social
Darwinism where only the most fit survive.168 Certainly it is difficult
to separate the child who suffered from soldiering from the soldier he
eventually became. Ongwen, the Brigadier General, carries with him
the same traumas and values formed by Ongwen the child soldier.
The former is but the necessary product of the latter. For the Court to
turn a blind eye to this reality runs the risk of failing to give life to
the rights of the child the law so vehemently seeks to protect.
IV. PASSING THE POISONED CHALICE:
DOCTRINAL REPERCUSSIONS OF ONGWEN
It is said that the greatest dangers to liberties “lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.”169 This Part will address the doctrinal repercussions
of ruling for or against the rotten social background as a defense of
the victim turned perpetrator.
A. CHILD SOLDIERS: VICTIM IN LAW, PERPETRATOR IN PRACTICE
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Rome Statute, any person under the
age of eighteen at the commission of a crime is excluded from the
166. See Green, supra note 2.
167. See also Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript of
the Confirmation of Charges, 56 (testifying that Ongwen was forced to commit
heinous acts that no child should even witness).
168. See id. at 35-36 (stating that Ongwen, although initially an abductee
transitioned into a LRA commander who abused others with his new-found
power).
169. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 106.
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ICC’s jurisdiction.170 A verba legis appreciation of this provision
suggests that in the eyes of the law, upon the child soldier’s
eighteenth birthday, he ipso facto sheds the protected status of
victim, and dons the role of perpetrator.171 There is an apparent
incongruity in protecting the rights of the child only to subsequently
try him upon his coming of age. As Ongwen’s Defense Counsel
forwarded in the Court’s Open Session, if the body of international
law truly seeks to defend the child soldier, it would be antithetical to
that purpose to impose criminal liability upon the unfortunate many
whom the law failed to protect.172
It has been argued that to indict Ongwen is to indict all of the child
soldiers in the world,173 as the Court’s decision determines not only
Ongwen’s fate but the narrative international law will shoulder in
dealing with the child soldier who has come of age. Ongwen’s
Defense Counsel was quick to point out that as the Court sits,
present-day child soldiers await to hear what would happen to them
if they risked to escape.174
The ICC has taken a favorable stance to the child soldier in the
past.175 The case of Lubanga recognized that the experience of the
child soldier is ongoing as it renders the child damaged for life. Who
they are today is but a derivative of their previous sufferings.176
Indeed, “[o]nce a child soldier in fact, always a child soldier in mind,
body, and soul.”177 Yet the Court seems to have taken a different
170. GRANT, supra note 87, at 10 (debating whether it is appropriate to hold a
former child solider responsible for crimes he then commits as an adult).
171. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG, Transcript
of the Confirmation of Charges, 15-16.
172. GRANT, supra note 87, at 17.
173. But see Drumbl, Victims Who Victimize, supra note 166, at 23-24 (arguing
that Ongwen went far beyond the abuse rendered by other child soldiers who
gained power and therefore he should be punished).
174. See GRANT, supra note 87, at 21 (stating that it isimperative to set
precedent).
175. See Drumbl, Victims Who Victimize, supra note 166, at 25 (differentiating
Ongwen’s case with Lubangas).
176. Report of Ms. Schauer (CHM-0001), The Psychological Impact of Child
Soldiering, ICC-01/0401/06-1729-Anx1 (EVD-CHM-00001).
177. See Mark A. Drumbl, Shifting Narratives: Ongwen and Lubanga on the
Effects of Child Soldiering, JUST. CONFLICT (April 20, 2016), https://justicein
conflict.org/2016/04/20/shifting-narratives-ongwen-and-lubanga-on-the-effects-of-
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approach in Ongwen, treating Ongwen’s respective roles as abductee
and abductor as separate and distinct, rather than one of cause and
effect.178
It is the opinion of the author that, rather than drawing a fine line
at the age of adulthood,179Ongwen must be adjudged in light of the
circumstances of the case in its totality. Such would be most in line
with the modern theory of criminal law, which recognizes “crime as
essentially a social and natural phenomenon.”180 Thus, the accused
cannot be “treated and checked by the application of abstract
principles of law . . . fixed and determined a priori, but rather
through the enforcement of individual measures in each particular
case after a thorough, personal and individual investigation[.]”181
Through the course of the proceedings, the ICC will bear the
burden of balancing the conflicting demands of criminal liability on
one end, and human rights protections of the child on the other.
Indeed, excusing Ongwen based on the circumstances of his past
may sow the seeds of our own future degradation;182 yet in that same
breath, perhaps the best reason to acknowledge Ongwen’s rotten
social background is that it would be the height of injustice to ignore
it.183
child-soldiering.
178. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges Against Dominic Ongwen, ¶¶ 150-51 (Mar. 23,
2016) (arguing that Ongwen was not criminally liable because he was an abductee
and was under duress).
179. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 106.
180. LUIS B. REYES, CRIMINAL LAW 24 (18th ed. 2012).
181. Id.
182. Orde Coombs, ‘Speak! Black Thugs Are Not Victims’, Essence, January
1984, 116:
It is evident that such spurious thinking must end, for it has led us as
a community to abandon old values, to excuse unconscionable
wrongs. . . . [I]n the excuses we make for the misconduct of our
young people . . . we sow the seeds of our own future degradation.
Those of us who work hard owe it to our-selves and to other Blacks
to refuse to put up with the current landscape of Black hooliganism
and self-contempt.
183. See Delgado, supra note 13, at 79 (summarizing the reasons for why
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B. OPENING THE FLOODGATES TO ABLANKETDEFENSE
Ongwen’s case may set precedent in more ways than one. While
others believed that ruling against liability will have serious
repercussions on the former child soldier, Ongwen’s acquittal also
poses a danger to the structure of ICL. Similar to the ratio decidendi
of the Court on duress, adopting the Rotten Social Background
defense would open the floodgates “to a blanket immunity to
members of criminal organizations which have brutal systems of
ensuring discipline.”184
Arguing against the Rotten Social Background defense, Professor
Stephen Morse emphasized that “all environments affect choice,
making some choices easy and others hard.”185 While external
circumstances, such as poverty, may indeed create a propensity to
commit crime, rarely does it completely eliminate a person’s power
of choice.186 While Professor Morse conceded to the correlation
between environment and crime, he denied any causal relationship
between the two.187
Professor Morse’s contentions are inapplicable to Ongwen. First,
the illusion of free will finds no room for application. The child
soldier is not given an easy or difficult choice but only the devil’s
choice.188 Coercively indoctrinated as a minor into the LRA, the LRA
compelled Ongwen to either suffer or carry out the suffering.
Through these acts he inculcated the values of the LRA, which he
carried with him through his adult life. Again, to argue against the
continuing nature of trauma and psychological burdens borne by the
former child soldier who has come of age is not only contrary to
reason but incompatible with the overarching objectives of
ignoring a rotten social background would be unfair).
184. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges ¶ 153.
185. Stephen Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1252 (1976).
186. See id. at 1267-68 (stating that power of choice is a basic human
capability).
187. See id. at 1260 (finding a correlation but not a causation between poverty
and crime).
188. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Transcript of the
Confirmation of Charges, 49.
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international law on the rights of the child.
Second, the poverty and crime analogy is incompatible with the
paradigm of a child soldier. As earlier established, IHRL, IHL, and
ICL prohibit the recruitment and use of child soldiers to avoid the
very situation where the child is exploited and coercively
indoctrinated by his captors.189 Unlike child soldiers who are deemed
victims in the eyes of the law, the penury does not enjoy a similar
status as casualties of economic circumstance.
Third, assuming that most are able to withstand internal restraints
engendered by external factors, that fact alone would not dictate the
Court’s proceedings. Indeed, the issue is not whether people in
general are capable of overcoming their rotten social background.
Instead, the question is whether the rotten social background of the
defendant was a causative factor in the commission of the crime.
It is not the role of the court to rule on hypotheticals.190 The Rome
Statute itself expressly mandates the Trial Chamber to “base its
decision only on evidence submitted and discussed before it at the
trial[,]”191 rather than mere potentialities.192 While the obvious danger
of opening the insanity defense to more liberal psychic affections is a
legitimate concern, neither the Statute nor Rules of Procedure and
Evidence give doctrinal repercussions value when weighing the
scales of justice.193
Put differently, to rule on Ongwen’s liability based on a probable
effect rather than deciding on the record per se could run afoul basic
tenets of due process and principles of fair play.194 Yet, perhaps,
doctrinal repercussions are but an inevitable consideration of
189. See also International Standards, CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L,
https://www.child-soldiers.org/international-standards (last visited Mar. 8, 2018)
(stating that IHL sets the limit at age 15).
190. See Dinah Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International
Courts, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 537, 570-71 (2009) (arguing that the court should be
hesitant when fact-finding).
191. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 134.
192. See id. (stating that the decision should be based on the totality of the
evidence).
193. See id. at 130-31 (discussing the rules of evidence).
194. See id. at 104 (asserting the applicable law); see also id. at 129-31
(describing the rules of evidence and the rights of the accused).
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adjudication, lest we forget that the record on which the Court judges
Ongwen today is the record on which history will judge the child
soldier tomorrow.195
V. CONCLUSION
There is ample basis to argue that Ongwen’s dreadful past as a
child soldier may blur the line of discernment. Because this is a
question of fact and not of law, it would be best adjudged on the
evidence presented in the course of the trial rather than legal precept
alone. Considering that the threshold of Article 31(1)(a) is the degree
of impairment, i.e. that it be more than a temporary mental defect but
a substantial disturbance of some duration, through the use of expert
testimony196 the Court is capable of making an objective
determination on whether Ongwen’s rotten social background
destroyed his capacity to appreciate the nature of his conduct. It must
be emphasized that the Rome Statute does not require “insanity” per
se to exclude criminal responsibility. Rather, the ground adopted by
the Statute is purposely made obscure to encompass any “mental
disease or defect” that destroys the capacity to appreciate the nature
of one’s conduct.
The Court in Ongwen faces the difficult task of determining where
the realm of the victim ends and that of the perpetrator begins. It
would be naive to suggest that the very traumas and long-term
psychological effects the law seeks to avoid magically vanish
because Ongwen is charged with the same crimes he fell prey to so
many years ago 197 upon his coming of age.198 It thus appears that the
195. See also Sarah Kihika Kasande & Virginie Ladisch, The Complex Reality
Beyond the Trial of Dominic Ongwen, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Dec. 5,
2016), https://www.ictj.org/news/complex-icc-ongwen (discussing the importance
of the Ongwen case and its lasting repercussions).
196. See also Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. )T-02-65/1-S, Sentencing
Judgement, ¶ 77 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003)
(noting that the defense introduced evidence from expert witness Dr. Mikolš Biro,
a University clinical psychologist professor who found the defendant able to
understand the consequences of their actions).
197. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-T-22-ENG,
Transcript of the Confirmation of Charges, 68 (stating that Ongwen’s past as a
child solider transcended into his adult life).
198. See also Cottier, supra note 36, at 468-69 (discussing the how international
2018] THE ROTTEN SOCIAL BACKGROUNDDEFENSE 635
Court must confront not only the hefty burden of adjudication but the
sensitivities of ensuring that the long-term objective of protecting the
child soldier is neither abandoned nor shifted.
law has focused on eradicating child solider recruitment).
